Mary Margaret McCabe
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Academic freedom and civility

16/9/2014

6 Comments

 
Recent celebrated cases, where universities have sought to discipline academic staff, to dismiss or even to refuse to employ them, have opened a debate about the nature of academic freedom, especially in the context of complaints about how individual academics express themselves.  

In the US the Salaita case (a recent discussion at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/middleeast/professors-angry-tweets-on-gaza-cost-him-a-job.html?_r=0 ) turned on Salaita’s tweets on Gaza, as a result of which his job offer from the University of Illinois was withdrawn. The situation was glossed by the University of Illinois as a debate between the principles of academic freedom and the demands of ‘civility’, where civility is taken to trump academic freedom (see http://illinois.edu/blog/view/1109/115906?count=1 ).  There has subsequently been a turn among some of the participants of the debate to take ‘civility’ to be ‘nonsense’, and to promote abrasive criticism apparently in defence of academic freedom (see Brian Leiter’s remarks at http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2014/09/the-duty-of-harsh-criticism.html juxtaposed with his ongoing coverage of the Salaita casehttp://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2014/09/fairly-even-handed-ny-times-item-on-the-salaita-case.html ). 

IN the UK, the Docherty case (constrained throughout by the confidentiality imposed by Warwick on Docherty himself) concerns the ongoing nine-month suspension of a vigorous critic of the UK higher education system. Thomas Docherty is subject to a disciplinary tribunal, not, according to the university,  for his views on universities, but for his tone and stance within his Department (http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/thomas-docherty-to-face-insubordination-charge-in-tribunal/2014711.article ). The disciplinary action by the university was apparently foreshadowed by a blog written by the University’s lawyers (http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/lawyer-compares-suarez-bite-to-academic-outspoken-opinion/2014359.article  and http://publicuniversity.org.uk/2014/07/04/academic-freedom-and-the-corporate-university/ ) as a sanction against ‘insubordination’. There are many other such cases, documented daily.   This all seems to be the most horrible mess, and badly to need rethinking.

The principles of academic freedom (see this 1940 US formula, since modified but in its central claims unchanged: http://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure  ) suppose that academic inquiry has no boundaries. If academic institutions exist for the pursuit of knowledge and understanding, whether alone, or with colleagues, or with students, such inquiry does not say in advance what may or may not be thought, or considered or assumed or believed.  Socrates’ injunction to follow the argument where it leads is surely the right one: inquiry is not constrained by canons of what can or cannot be said or thought.  This is true, at whatever level the inquiry occurs. So an inquiry into inquiry is similarly unconstrained.  Equally, an inquiry into how inquiry should be institutionalized is free in the same way.  The context of inquiry, that is, is a suitable topic for inquiry too – the openness runs across fields and up the orders, to include, of course, the inquiry into academic freedom itself.

If that is right, then the basis of academic freedom is internal to the nature of academic business.  Academic freedom, that is, is an epistemic condition on thought where it occurs in an academic context – that it should be unbounded and untrammelled (this does not, of course, imply that there are obligations on others to fund any thought at all).  If that is right in turn, then academic freedom is in the first instance an epistemic condition, rather than a moral one: we find its basis by thinking, not about Kant or Mill (despite the nice arguments here http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/how-academia-traded-freedom-for-justice/14847#.VBcYHVZ5CaB ), but about the nature of thought.  It is – one might say – a norm of thought that it should thus be free.

But here there is an immediate difficulty.  This sense of ‘free’ is nothing like the sense in which we might demand ‘free speech’ as a right, or in the sense supported by the US First Amendment.  The latter sense is from the very outset moral or political. It is a context where we may indeed appeal to Kant on autonomy or Mill on liberty: we take it as fundamental to our political liberty that we may say what we wish without hindrance.  But since freedom of speech is a moral and political issue, from the outset, there are bound to be other moral claims which may limit it – for example, the free speaking of racist sentiments is morally deplorable; and the moral balance between the right to say what one wants and the right of others to be regarded as equal is not obviously titled in favour of freedom and against equality.  Because freedom of speech is moral, its limitations are moral too.

Academic freedom, however, is freedom of a different kind – it is a kind of epistemic freedom. Suppose then that an institution seeks to curtail that – to curtail, that is to say, the activity of an academic to follow the argument where it leads.  This move by the institution is, I suggest, pragmatically incoherent. If the institution exists to promote thought (of course that is up for grabs too these days – but for the moment let us imagine an institution that exists to promote the search for, and the spread of, knowledge and understanding) then to seek at the same time to impose boundaries on thought, is in a formal sense, absurd.

Nonetheless, academic freedom is exercised in speech.  It falls also, then, under the right to freedom of speech; but it is not merely a contextual variant of freedom of speech. What academics may say in private is supported by the principle of free speech, and limited by the constraints on that, whether they be legal or moral.  What they say qua academics is governed by academic freedom, and it relies on thinking about thought as functioning without boundaries.

What are we to say, then, of civility?  Civility is, we might think, a moral matter (and not a matter of mere manners).  What is more, civility is a moral aspiration, not, as it were, a sine qua non of any moral activity: we seek to be civil and thoughtful and polite and sincere –we backslide, alas, all the time (I speak for myself, at least), but we may keep on trying.  As a moral aspiration this is not unconditional; it does not, that is, automatically trump other moral imperatives.  Nor does it trump imperatives that come, as I suggested, from the nature of thought  -- although both in morals and in thought civility may well need to be taken seriously.   Civility is an important aspiration in the context of inquiry that is free in the sense I outlined.  For free inquiry occurs between and among people; and people are over and over affected not only by the content of what is said, or even the general import of what is said, but also by its manner and its tone.  Loud and fierce declarations of opinion often force an interlocutor to be silent, or to be afraid; in such cases civility is clearly conducive to an effective and productive exchange of ideas.  Conversely, it can happen that an interlocutor refuses to listen (this, perhaps, is what we see most often in the cases where institutional force majeure is wielded); and on such occasions incivility may well be excusable, or even required.  These issues must be case by case (such is the way of complex moral requirements). But perhaps in general we might think that free inquiry is promoted when each party keeps their temper, minds their language, and tries to attend to the other point of view (I give you the case of Socrates, again – it is a mark of how hard civility is to achieve, or even to believe in, that his persistent good temper and good manners, in the face of the hemlock, invites first-time readers to construe what he says as ‘irony’).

But whatever the case, the issue of civility is orthogonal to the epistemic demand of freedom. If we make the mistake that they are converses, then some nasty consequences follow.  In the present discussion of the Salaita case, some have taken there to be a choice between academic freedom and civility, and to think that in that case we need to ensure incivility in order to maintain academic freedom. Others have thought and said that civility is somehow a soft-hearted muffler of proper intellectual integrity, and should be thrown off in favour of its alternative. But this is to buy into the mistake already perpetrated by the arguments of the University of Illinois and others. Academic freedom is not the alternative to civility.   Academic freedom is the sine qua non of academic thought; civility helps it along.

6 Comments
Brian link
16/9/2014 01:31:21 am

Thanks for your interesting comments; civility is indeed often helpful for realizing the values of academic freedom. My point was not, however, about academic freedom, but about Salaita's constitutional right to free speech: he has a constitutional right to express his political point of view in vulgar and inflammatory terms, and he has a constitutional right not to be punished by the state for doing so. My own views about civility, in the classroom and in the polity at large, are here (and perhaps not that far off what you are saying): http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1804544

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Richard Baron link
16/9/2014 07:46:47 am

I agree with the position you take, MM, but I would like to raise a technical issue that might (or might not) have wider ramifications. I wonder whether we should see academic freedom (in the sense that you give it):

(a) as part of the constitution of academic thought - so the activity of academic thinking is deficient in itself if the freedom is limited; or

(b) as a non-constitutive requirement for effective academic thinking. (We may note in passing that it could be such a requirement even if no productive avenue of exploration was in fact blocked by a restriction on the freedom, because reviewers of work done might doubt the work's worth if they knew that the people doing the work had been constrained, so that they might have missed something, and that doubt could limit the acceptance of conclusions that were in fact correct.)

I think it would be much more straightforward to make a case for (b). But if we could make a case for (a) as well, that might be safer. If only (b) is established, it won't be long before someone says "Of course we want you to be effective, but a few little restrictions won't detract from effectiveness that much - certainly no more than the limitation on funding that you accept we must all endure - and we have to strike a balance and not expect to be fully effective in every respect".

I think there is a parallel with the other freedom, the general freedom of speech. Free expression could be seen as either or both of:

(a) part of the constitution of a flourishing human being - if you are constrained to keep quiet when you want to say something, on any topic, a little of you dies;

(b) jolly useful in allowing us to share and test new ideas, make political progress, learn about alternative ways of living, and so on.

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Richard Baron link
16/9/2014 07:58:56 am

Whoops, I meant to add that although you said:

"the basis of academic freedom is internal to the nature of academic business ... Academic freedom, that is, is an epistemic condition on thought where it occurs in an academic context ... we find its basis by thinking ... about the nature of thought. It is – one might say – a norm of thought that it should thus be free. ... What they say qua academics is governed by academic freedom, and it relies on thinking about thought as functioning without boundaries.",

that still did not quite convince me that you had my option (a) in mind. The phrases "condition on thought" and "a norm of thought" held my back because they suggested something external to the activity of academic thought. But maybe you did have something like my option (a) in mind all the time.

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Froma Zeitlin
16/9/2014 03:50:51 pm

darling MM,
Following your incisive philosophical reasoning, I can only applaud your well deserved reputation for brilliance. But the case of Salaita raises a host of issues that are not merely limited to some abstract notion of civility or academic freedom without consideration of boundaries that pass from intemperateness to irresponsible demagoguery and hate speech. The language one uses indicates more about professorial conduct and emotional stability than the free expression of opinion. Here are a few samples: He tweeted on April 25 (that is, well before the recent fighting in Gaza): “I’ve had a horrible influx of Zio-trolls today. It’s like getting a case of the scabies. They burrow in and you want to rip off your skin.” July, 9: “There’s something profoundly sexual to the Zionist pleasure w/#Israel’s aggression Sublimation through bloodletting, a common perversion.”.
And: “Zionists, take responsibility: If your dream of an ethnocratic Israel is worth the murder of children, just f–cking own it already,” And, “If you’re defending #Israel right now, you’re an awful human being.”
Some others were: “If [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu appeared on TV with a necklace made from the teeth of Palestinian children, would anybody be surprised?” And “Zionist uplift in America: Every little Jewish boy and girl in America can grow up to be the leader of a murderous colonial regime.” Aside from the fact that Salaita's defenders would not tolerate the same license to direct similar comments at black people, gay people, or women, the University of Illinois has a clearly written code of ethics as follows: .(I quote only the relevant bits). The Code
Those acting on behalf of the University have a general duty to conduct themselves in a manner that will maintain and strengthen the public's trust and confidence in the integrity of the University and take no actions incompatible with their obligations to the University.
With regard to professional conduct, those acting on behalf of the University should practice:
• Integrity by maintaining an ongoing dedication to honesty and responsibility;
• Trustworthiness by acting in a reliable and dependable manner;
• Evenhandedness by treating others with impartiality;
• Respect by treating others with civility and decency;
One cannot simply separate private utterances from public conduct and in this legal tangle (his job offer was conditional, subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees), I think this case is not as complicated as others might see it..

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Christine
16/9/2014 04:25:54 pm

If "one cannot simply separate private utterances from public conduct in this legal tangle", one also cannot separate private utterances from the situation on the ground in Gaza.

Reply
Tania
12/3/2015 11:16:20 pm

I have a deep sympathy with Froma Zeitlin’s views on this matter.
I think that this is not simply about civility, public versus private utterances, or even ‘academic freedom’ – but about the responsibility which comes with academic authority and the breakdown of what constitutes ‘private’ utterances within the internet world.
First – twitter and other forms of public social media are not ‘private utterances’. Salaita, presumably, is not an unintelligent man and, if he is sufficiently internet-savvy to be able to master the art of posting on Twitter, it seems safe to assume that his is sufficiently savvy to know that his Tweets are open to public access. Nor is Twitter an academic context- it is not reviewed or mediated in any way and it’s Tweets are far too short to allow any considered academic judgement to be expressed.
So- let’s imagine a scenario: a Jewish student enrols to take one of Salaita’s courses at University of Illinois. Like many of our students these days, he googles his new professor to find out some more about his academic background and work. To his dismay, he is alerted to Salaita’s anti-Israel tweets, of which there were hundreds and which were more than explicit in making a connection between what Salaita sees as Israel’s despicable and inhumane policies and all Jews, regardless of nationality or political affiliation.
One of the most controversial of his tweets was: ‘Zionists: transforming "antisemitism" from something horrible into something honorable since 1948’. Salaita and others have argued that this tweet does not condone anti-Semitism, but actually critiques those who see criticism of Israel as necessarily anti-Semitic. But, is this what it really does? If you accept that Zionism is immoral and that you accept that anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism, then, yes, it would seem logical to assume that anti-Semitism is a moral or ‘honorable’ position. But, Tweets are not fully argued positions- they are short pithy aphorisms, which are frequently getting their authors in trouble, precisely because their brevity allows little space for analysis. More logically, despite the quotation marks, one would read this tweet as suggesting that the State of Israel is, in itself, a moral justification for anti-Semitism.
Our hypothetical student – let’s call him Paul Cohen – feels pretty uncomfortable at this point. Does he want to be taught by someone who holds these views; even though he has no particularly strong feelings about either Israel or his religion; does he not have some sort of moral responsibility to challenge his Professor; will his obviously Jewish surname bias his Professor against him; is the most sensible option simply to change course or even to think about changing University, as his confidence in his chosen institution has been profoundly shaken?
This brings me on to my second point – responsibility to our students. As academics we have dual roles, we produce ideas, but we also educate. Much as a ‘publish or perish’ mind-set may often lead us to deprioritise the latter, it is our role as educators which should be at least equally important. We have a responsibility to our students to uphold, in public, the liberal values of the societies in which we live and teach, so that our students can come to us and express their views without feeling that they will be judged on grounds of race, religion, socioeconomic status, gender, age or sexuality. By publishing his tweets, Salaita blew this – they were not some ‘private’ conversation amongst friends or colleagues- they were inflammatory examples of hate-speech, alluding to some of the most insidious ideas and images of anti-Semitism, many of which extend far further back than 1948. The danger of the internet is that, once ideas are out there and tweeted in the public domain, they are ‘out there’ – not through phone-tapping or subterfuge- but by the deliberate actions of their author.
(Socrates may have been uncivil, but he did not make pronouncements or seek to indoctrinate his interlocutors – his lack of civility was found in his determination to make his interlocutors question their inconsistent beliefs. As academics we should perhaps attempt to be a bit more superficially civil towards our students, if we are not to scare them away from our classes – but, this should not be at the forefront of our agenda when trying to help them learn to question ideas. )
Third - epistemic authority and hate speech: Rae Langton has written about how the harm of ‘hate speech’ is greater when it comes from a speaker who is perceived to have expertise and therefore has ‘epistemic authority’. As academics we are perceived to have expertise – we are invested with the authority to shape the minds of the you

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